The Freedom of the Will

"I see it," I said, "and I agree that it is, as you say, so. But in this chain of causes that cling to one another, is there any freedom of our will? Or does the chain of fate bind even the very movements of the human soul?"

"There is freedom," she said. "For there could be no rational nature without there also being freedom of the will present in it. For whatever can by its nature use reason has the power of judgment by which it distinguishes each thing; and so, of itself, it discerns what is to be avoided and what is to be desired. Now whatever someone judges to be desirable, he seeks; and what he reckons should be avoided, he flees. Therefore, in those beings in which reason is present, there is also the freedom of willing and refusing. But I do not establish that this freedom is equal in all. For to the supernal and divine substances there belong a clear-sighted judgment, an incorruptible will, and the power, effective in action, to obtain what they desire. Human souls, however, are necessarily more free when they keep themselves in the contemplation of the divine mind, less free when they slip down toward bodies, and less still when they are bound up in earthly limbs. But their final servitude comes when, given over to vices, they fall from possession of their own reason. For when they have cast their eyes down from the light of the highest truth to lower and dark things, they are at once dimmed by a cloud of ignorance, troubled by ruinous passions; and by yielding and consenting to these passions, they aid the servitude they have brought upon themselves, and become, in a way, captives of their own freedom. Yet that gaze of providence, which beholds all things from eternity, sees all this, and disposes each thing, predestined, according to its merits."

'I am following needfully,' said I, 'and I agree that it is as thou sayest. But in this series of linked causes is there any freedom left to our will, or does the chain of fate bind also the very motions of our souls?'

'There is freedom,' said she; 'nor, indeed, can any creature be rational, unless he be endowed with free will. For that which hath the natural use of reason has the faculty of discriminative judgment, and of itself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired. Now, everyone seeks what he judges desirable, and avoids what he thinks should be shunned. Wherefore, beings endowed with reason possess also the faculty of free choice and refusal. But I suppose this faculty not equal alike in all. The higher Divine essences possess a clear-sighted judgment, an uncorrupt will, and an effective power of accomplishing their wishes. Human souls must needs be comparatively free while they abide in the contemplation of the Divine mind, less free when they pass into bodily form, and still less, again, when they are enwrapped in earthly members. But when they are given over to vices, and fall from the possession of their proper reason, then indeed their condition is utter slavery. For when they let their gaze fall from the light of highest truth to the lower world where darkness reigns, soon ignorance blinds their vision; they are disturbed by baneful affections, by yielding and assenting to which they help to promote the slavery in which they are involved, and are in a manner led captive by reason of their very liberty. Yet He who seeth all things from eternity beholdeth these things with the eyes of His providence, and assigneth to each what is predestined for it by its merits:

'"All things surveying, all things overhearing."'