Is There Such a Thing as Chance?

She had spoken, and was turning the course of her discourse toward treating and clearing up certain other matters. Then I said: "Your exhortation is indeed right, and entirely worthy of your authority; but as for what you said a while ago, that the question of providence is entangled with many others, I find it true in practice. For I ask whether you think that chance exists at all, and, if so, what you take it to be."

Then she said: "I am eager to discharge the debt of my promise, and to open up for you the path by which you may be carried back to your homeland. These matters, however, though most useful to know, are nonetheless a little turned aside from the track of our purpose; and there is reason to fear that, wearied by these detours, you may not be equal to completing the straight road."

"Have no fear of that at all," I said. "For it will be like a rest for me to recognize the things in which I most delight; and at the same time, once every side of your argument has stood firm in unshaken faith, nothing will remain in doubt about what follows."

Then she said: "I will do as you wish." And she began thus: "If anyone should define chance as an outcome produced by a random movement and by no connection of causes, I affirm that there is no such thing as chance at all, and I judge it to be, apart from signifying the matter at hand, an entirely empty word. For what room can be left for randomness, when God constrains all things into order? For 'nothing comes from nothing' is a true saying, which none of the ancients ever contradicted, though they laid it down as a kind of foundation for all their reasonings about nature, applying it not to the active first principle but to the material substrate. But if anything were to arise from no causes, it would seem to have arisen out of nothing. And if this cannot happen, then neither is it possible for there to be chance of the kind we defined just now."

"What then?" I said. "Is there nothing that can rightly be called chance or accident? Or is there something to which these words apply, even if it is hidden from the common crowd?"

"My Aristotle," she said, "defined it in his Physics, both briefly and close to the truth."

"In what way?" I asked.

"Whenever something is done for the sake of some purpose," she said, "and something other than what was intended comes about for certain reasons, this is called chance. For example, if a man, while digging the ground in order to cultivate his field, should find a buried mass of gold: this is believed to have happened by chance. Yet it does not come from nothing, for it has its own proper causes, whose unforeseen and unexpected meeting seems to have produced the chance event. For unless the farmer had been digging the ground, and unless the man who buried it had hidden his money in that very spot, the gold would not have been found. These, then, are the causes of the lucky windfall, which comes from causes that meet and flow together, not from the intention of the one acting. For neither the man who buried the gold nor the one who worked the field intended that the money should be found; but, as I said, it happened that the one dug where the other had buried, and the two coincided. We may therefore define chance as an unexpected outcome arising from concurrent causes in things done for some purpose. But the order that proceeds by an inescapable chain of connection — the order that, descending from the fountain of providence, arranges all things in their places and times — this is what makes the causes meet and flow together."

She ceased, and was about to pass on in her discourse to the exposition of other matters, when I break in and say: 'Excellent is thine exhortation, and such as well beseemeth thy high authority; but I am even now experiencing one of the many difficulties which, as thou saidst but now, beset the question of providence. I want to know whether thou deemest that there is any such thing as chance at all, and, if so, what it is.'

Then she made answer: 'I am anxious to fulfil my promise completely, and open to thee a way of return to thy native land. As for these matters, though very useful to know, they are yet a little removed from the path of our design, and I fear lest digressions should fatigue thee, and thou shouldst find thyself unequal to completing the direct journey to our goal.'

'Have no fear for that,' said I. 'It is rest to me to learn, where learning brings delight so exquisite, especially when thy argument has been built up on all sides with undoubted conviction, and no place is left for uncertainty in what follows.'

She made answer: 'I will accede to thy request;' and forthwith she thus began: 'If chance be defined as a result produced by random movement without any link of causal connection, I roundly affirm that there is no such thing as chance at all, and consider the word to be altogether without meaning, except as a symbol of the thing designated. What place can be left for random action, when God constraineth all things to order? For "ex nihilo nihil" is sound doctrine which none of the ancients gainsaid, although they used it of material substance, not of the efficient principle; this they laid down as a kind of basis for all their reasonings concerning nature. Now, if a thing arise without causes, it will appear to have arisen from nothing. But if this cannot be, neither is it possible for there to be chance in accordance with the definition just given.'

'Well,' said I, 'is there, then, nothing which can properly be called chance or accident, or is there something to which these names are appropriate, though its nature is dark to the vulgar?'

'Our good Aristotle,' says she, 'has defined it concisely in his "Physics," and closely in accordance with the truth.'

'How, pray?' said I.

'Thus,' says she: 'Whenever something is done for the sake of a particular end, and for certain reasons some other result than that designed ensues, this is called chance; for instance, if a man is digging the earth for tillage, and finds a mass of buried gold. Now, such a find is regarded as accidental; yet it is not "ex nihilo," for it has its proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of which has brought the chance about. For had not the cultivator been digging, had not the man who hid the money buried it in that precise spot, the gold would not have been found. These, then, are the reasons why the find is a chance one, in that it results from causes which met together and concurred, not from any intention on the part of the discoverer. Since neither he who buried the gold nor he who worked in the field intended that the money should be found, but, as I said, it happened by coincidence that one dug where the other buried the treasure. We may, then, define chance as being an unexpected result flowing from a concurrence of causes where the several factors had some definite end. But the meeting and concurrence of these causes arises from that inevitable chain of order which, flowing from the fountain-head of Providence, disposes all things in their due time and place.'