Rising to the Higher Vision

"Now if, in the perceiving of bodies, although the qualities presented from outside affect the instruments of the senses, and although the passion of the body comes before the vigor of the active soul — the passion which calls forth in itself the act of the mind and rouses the forms that meanwhile rest within — if, I say, in perceiving bodies the soul is not stamped by passion, but by its own power judges the passion that is presented to the body, how much more do those things which are released from all bodily affections, in their discerning, not follow objects presented from outside, but carry out the act of their own mind? By this reasoning, manifold kinds of knowing have fallen to diverse and differing substances. For sense alone, deprived of all the other kinds of knowing, has fallen to motionless living things, such as the shellfish of the sea and the other things that are nourished while clinging to rocks. Imagination has fallen to mobile beasts, in which there already seems to be present some affection of fleeing or seeking. But reason belongs to the human race alone, just as intelligence belongs to the divine alone; whence it comes about that that knowing surpasses the others which by its own nature knows not only its proper object but also the objects of the other kinds of knowing.

"What then, if sense and imagination should resist reasoning, saying that that universal, which reason thinks it beholds, is nothing? For — they argue — what is sensible or imaginable cannot be universal: either, then, the judgment of reason is true and there is nothing sensible; or, since it is known to itself that many things are subject to the senses and to imagination, the conception of reason is empty, since it considers what is sensible and singular as though it were something universal. To this, if reason should answer in turn that it indeed beholds both what is sensible and what is imaginable under the aspect of universality, but that they cannot aspire to the knowledge of universality, since their kind of knowing cannot exceed bodily shapes, and that in the knowledge of things one should rather trust the firmer and more perfect judgment — in a dispute of this kind, would not we, in whom there is the power of reasoning as well as of imagining and perceiving, rather approve the cause of reason?

"It is much the same when human reason thinks that the divine intelligence cannot behold future things except as reason itself knows them. For you argue thus: 'If certain things seem not to have certain and necessary outcomes, they cannot be foreknown as certainly going to come about. Of these things, then, there is no foreknowledge; and if we should believe that there is foreknowledge even of these, then there will be nothing that does not come about by necessity.' If, then, just as we share in reason, we could also possess the judgment of the divine mind, then, just as we judged that imagination and sense ought to yield to reason, so we should deem it most just that human reason submit itself to the divine mind. Therefore let us raise ourselves, if we can, to the summit of that supreme intelligence; for there reason will see what it cannot behold in itself — namely, in what way even the things that do not have certain outcomes are seen by a foreknowledge that is nonetheless certain and definite; and that this is not opinion, but rather the simplicity of supreme knowledge, enclosed within no limits."

'Now, although in the case of bodies endowed with sentiency the qualities of external objects affect the sense-organs, and the activity of mind is preceded by a bodily affection which calls forth the mind's action upon itself, and stimulates the forms till that moment lying inactive within, yet, I say, if in these bodies endowed with sentiency the mind is not inscribed by mere passive affection, but of its own efficacy discriminates the impressions furnished to the body, how much more do intelligences free from all bodily affections employ in their discrimination their own mental activities instead of conforming to external objects? So on these principles various modes of cognition belong to distinct and different substances. For to creatures void of motive power—shell-fish and other such creatures which cling to rocks and grow there—belongs Sense alone, void of all other modes of gaining knowledge; to beasts endowed with movement, in whom some capacity of seeking and shunning seems to have arisen, Imagination also. Thought pertains only to the human race, as Intelligence to Divinity alone; hence it follows that that form of knowledge exceeds the rest which of its own nature cognizes not only its proper object, but the objects of the other forms of knowledge also. But what if Sense and Imagination were to gainsay Thought, and declare that universal which Thought deems itself to behold to be nothing? For the object of Sense and Imagination cannot be universal; so that either the judgment of Reason is true and there is no sense-object, or, since they know full well that many objects are presented to Sense and Imagination, the conception of Reason, which looks on that which is perceived by Sense and particular as if it were a something "universal," is empty of content. Suppose, further, that Reason maintains in reply that it does indeed contemplate the object of both Sense and Imagination under the form of universality, while Sense and Imagination cannot aspire to the knowledge of the universal, since their cognizance cannot go beyond bodily figures, and that in the cognition of reality we ought rather to trust the stronger and more perfect faculty of judgment. In a dispute of this sort, should not we, in whom is planted the faculty of reasoning as well as of imagining and perceiving, espouse the cause of Reason?

'In like manner is it that human reason thinks that Divine Intelligence cannot see the future except after the fashion in which its own knowledge is obtained. For thy contention is, if events do not appear to involve certain and necessary issues, they cannot be foreseen as certainly about to come to pass. There is, then, no foreknowledge of such events; or, if we can ever bring ourselves to believe that there is, there can be nothing which does not happen of necessity. If, however, we could have some part in the judgment of the Divine mind, even as we participate in Reason, we should think it perfectly just that human Reason should submit itself to the Divine mind, no less than we judged that Imagination and Sense ought to yield to Reason. Wherefore let us soar, if we can, to the heights of that Supreme Intelligence; for there Reason will see what in itself it cannot look upon; and that is in what way things whose occurrence is not certain may yet be seen in a sure and definite foreknowledge; and that this foreknowledge is not conjecture, but rather knowledge in its supreme simplicity, free of all limits and restrictions.'