Providence and Fate

"So it is," I said. "But since it is part of your office to unfold the causes of hidden things, and to explain the reasonings veiled in darkness, I beg you to set forth what you decree in this matter, since this marvel disturbs me most of all."

Then she, smiling a little, said: "You call me to a matter that is the greatest of all to inquire into, one for which scarcely anything could be enough though exhausted. For the material is such that, when one doubt is cut away, innumerable others spring up like the heads of the Hydra, and there would be no limit unless one were to check them with the most lively fire of the mind. For in this matter it is usual to inquire about the simplicity of providence, the chain of fate, sudden chances, divine knowledge and predestination, and the freedom of the will — how great a burden these are you yourself weigh. But since to know these things too is a portion of your medicine, although hedged about by the narrow limit of time, I will nonetheless try to consider something. And if the delights of musical song please you, you must put off this pleasure a little while, until I weave together for you the arguments linked in their proper order."

"As you wish," I said.

Then, beginning as if from another starting point, she discoursed thus: "The generation of all things, the whole progress of changeable natures, and whatever is moved in any way, takes its causes, order, and forms from the stability of the divine mind. This mind, set in the citadel of its own simplicity, establishes a manifold manner for the carrying out of things. This manner, when it is regarded in the very purity of the divine intelligence, is named providence; but when it is referred to those things which it moves and arranges, it has been called by the ancients fate. That these are different will easily be plain, if anyone considers in his mind the force of each. For providence is that very divine reason, established in the supreme ruler of all things, which arranges everything; while fate is the disposition inherent in movable things, through which providence binds each thing in its own orders. For providence embraces all things together, however diverse, however infinite; but fate distributes individual things, set in motion and apportioned among places, forms, and times — so that this unfolding of temporal order, gathered into one in the foresight of the divine mind, is providence, while that same gathering, distributed and unfolded in time, is called fate.

"Although these are different, yet the one depends on the other. For the order of fate proceeds from the simplicity of providence. For just as a craftsman, conceiving in his mind beforehand the form of the thing to be made, sets in motion the carrying out of the work, and leads through temporal orders what he had foreseen simply and as present — so God by providence disposes the things to be done singly and stably, but by fate administers in manifold and temporal fashion these very things which he disposed. Therefore, whether fate is carried out by certain divine spirits serving providence, or whether the chain of fate is woven by the soul, or by all nature serving, or by the celestial motions of the stars, or by angelic power, or by the various skill of demons, or by some of these, or by all — this at least is manifest: that providence is the unmoving and simple form of the things to be done, while fate is the movable interweaving and temporal order of those things which the divine simplicity disposed to be done.

"So it comes about that all things which are subject to fate are also subject to providence, to which fate itself too is subject; but certain things which are placed under providence rise above the chain of fate. And these are the things which, fixed stably near the first divinity, exceed the order of fatal mutability. For as, among orbits revolving about the same center, the innermost approaches the simplicity of the middle and is, as it were, a kind of pivot for the rest placed outside it, about which they revolve, while the outermost, rolled in a greater circuit, the farther it departs from the indivisible middle point, is spread out over the larger spaces — but if anything connects and joins itself to that middle, it is drawn into simplicity and ceases to be spread out and to flow away — by a like reasoning, what departs farther from the first mind is entangled in the greater bonds of fate, and a thing is so much the freer from fate the more nearly it seeks that center of things. And if it cleaves to the firmness of the supreme mind, lacking motion, it surpasses also the necessity of fate. Therefore, as reasoning is to understanding, as what comes to be is to what is, as time is to eternity, as the circle to the central point, so is the movable chain of fate to the stable simplicity of providence.

"That chain moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements among themselves, and transforms them by alternate exchange; the same renews all things that are born and that die through similar progressions of offspring and seeds. This same chain binds also the acts and fortunes of men by an indissoluble connection of causes; and since this connection sets out from the beginnings of unmoving providence, these too must necessarily be unchangeable. For things are governed in the best way if the simplicity remaining in the divine mind brings forth an unswerving order of causes, and this order restrains by its own unchangeableness the changeable things which would otherwise flow about at random. So it comes about that, although to you, who are by no means able to consider this order, all things seem confused and disturbed, nonetheless their own manner, directing all toward the good, disposes them. For there is nothing that is done for the sake of evil, even by the wicked themselves; whom, as has been most abundantly shown, a perverse error turns aside while they are seeking the good — much less does the order proceeding from the pivot of the supreme good turn anything aside from its own beginning.

"'But what confusion,' you will say, 'can be more unjust than that to the good there should befall now adverse, now prosperous things, and to the bad likewise now what they wish, now what they hate?' Are human beings, then, of such soundness of mind that those whom they have judged upright or wicked must also be, as they reckon, such? But in this human judgments clash, and those whom some think worthy of reward, others think worthy of punishment.

"But let us grant that someone can distinguish good men from bad. Will he then be able to look into that innermost balance of souls, as it is usually spoken of in bodies? It is not unlike the marvel to one who does not know why, to healthy bodies, sweet things suit some, but bitter things others; why some sick people are helped by mild remedies, others by sharp ones. But the physician, who discerns the manner and balance of health itself and of sickness, does not marvel at it at all. Now what else does the health of souls seem to be than uprightness? And what sickness, than vices? And who else is either the preserver of the good or the driver-off of the bad than God, the ruler and healer of minds? When he looks out from the high watchtower of providence, he recognizes what suits each one and applies what he knows to suit. Here now arises that notable marvel of the fatal order, when something is done by one who knows, at which the ignorant are astonished.

"For — to touch upon a few things of the divine depth that human reason has power to reach — concerning the man whom you think most just and most observant of equity, to providence, which knows all, it appears otherwise. And our familiar Lucan reminded us that the victorious cause pleased the gods, but the vanquished cause pleased Cato. So whatever you see done here contrary to expectation, it is, for things themselves, a right order, but for your opinion, a perverse confusion. But suppose someone is of such good character that divine judgment and human alike agree about him, yet he is weak in strength of soul: if anything adverse befalls him, he will perhaps cease to cultivate the innocence by which he could not keep fortune. So a wise dispensation spares the one whom adversity might make worse, lest it allow him to labor whom it does not suit to labor. There is another perfect in all the virtues, holy, and very near to God: providence judges it a sacrilege that he be touched by any adversities whatever, so much so that it does not allow him to be troubled even by bodily diseases. For, as one more excellent even than I has said:

The ethereal powers built the body of a holy man.

"It often happens, too, that the highest governance of affairs is given to the good, so that overflowing wickedness may be beaten back. To others providence distributes things mixed, according to the quality of their souls. Some it bites, lest they grow wanton through long prosperity; others it allows to be harassed by hardships, so that they may strengthen the virtues of the soul by the practice and exercise of patience. Some fear more than is right what they are able to bear; others despise more than is right what they are not able to bear. These it leads through sad things to the testing of themselves. Some have purchased a name to be revered through the ages at the price of a glorious death. Some, unconquerable under torments, have offered an example to the rest that virtue is unconquered by evils — and that these things happen rightly and in due order, and for the good of those to whom they seem to come, there is no doubt.

"For that too — that to the wicked there come now sad, now wished-for things — is drawn from the same causes. And concerning the sad things, no one marvels, since everyone judges them to have deserved ill. Their punishments both deter the rest from crimes and correct those very men on whom they are visited; while glad things speak a great argument to the good as to what they ought to judge about happiness of this kind, which they often see waiting upon the wicked. In which matter I believe this too is dispensed: that someone's nature is perhaps so headlong and unruly that want of family means might drive him the more bitterly into crimes; for his sickness providence supplies the remedy of bestowed money. Another, looking at his conscience defiled with base deeds and comparing himself with his fortune, perhaps grows afraid lest the loss of that whose use is pleasant to him be grievous. So he will change his ways, and while he fears to lose his fortune, he abandons his wickedness. Others, by prosperity unworthily handled, have been hurled into deserved ruin. To some the right of punishing has been permitted, so that it might be a cause of exercise to the good and of punishment to the bad. For as there is no compact between the upright and the wicked, so the wicked cannot agree even among themselves. Why not, since each is at variance with himself through the vices that tear his conscience apart, and they often do things which, once done, they decide ought not to have been done? From which that supreme providence has often brought forth a notable marvel: that the bad should make the bad good. For while certain men think they suffer unjust things from the worst, burning with hatred of the harmful, they have returned to the fruit of virtue, while they strive to be unlike those whom they hated.

"For the divine power alone is that to which evils too are goods, when, using them fittingly, it draws out the effect of some good. For a certain order embraces all things, so that whatever departs from the reason assigned to that order, this — though it falls back into another order — still falls into an order, lest anything in the kingdom of providence be left to chance.

But it is hard for me to tell all these things, as if I were a god.

"For it is not lawful for a man either to grasp with his mind all the contrivances of the divine work, or to explain them in speech. Let it suffice to have perceived only this: that God, the author of all natures, the same, directing all things toward the good, disposes them; and while he hastens to keep the things he brought forth in his own likeness, he banishes every evil from the bounds of his commonwealth through the chain of fatal necessity. So it comes about that the evils which are believed to abound on earth, if you look to the disposing providence, you would weigh to be nowhere at all.

"But I see that you have long been both burdened by the weight of the question and wearied by the length of the reasoning, and that you await some sweetness of song. Take, then, a draught by which, refreshed, you may strive the more firmly into what lies further."

'True,' said I; 'but, since it is thy office to unfold the hidden cause of things, and explain principles veiled in darkness, inform me, I pray thee, of thine own conclusions in this matter, since the marvel of it is what more than aught else disturbs my mind.'

A smile played one moment upon her lips as she replied: 'Thou callest me to the greatest of all subjects of inquiry, a task for which the most exhaustive treatment barely suffices. Such is its nature that, as fast as one doubt is cut away, innumerable others spring up like Hydra's heads, nor could we set any limit to their renewal did we not apply the mind's living fire to suppress them. For there come within its scope the questions of the essential simplicity of providence, of the order of fate, of unforeseen chance, of the Divine knowledge and predestination, and of the freedom of the will. How heavy is the weight of all this thou canst judge for thyself. But, inasmuch as to know these things also is part of the treatment of thy malady, we will try to give them some consideration, despite the restrictions of the narrow limits of our time. Moreover, thou must for a time dispense with the pleasures of music and song, if so be that thou findest any delight therein, whilst I weave together the connected train of reasons in proper order.'

'As thou wilt,' said I.

Then, as if making a new beginning, she thus discoursed: 'The coming into being of all things, the whole course of development in things that change, every sort of thing that moves in any wise, receives its due cause, order, and form from the steadfastness of the Divine mind. This mind, calm in the citadel of its own essential simplicity, has decreed that the method of its rule shall be manifold. Viewed in the very purity of the Divine intelligence, this method is called providence; but viewed in regard to those things which it moves and disposes, it is what the ancients called fate. That these two are different will easily be clear to anyone who passes in review their respective efficacies. Providence is the Divine reason itself, seated in the Supreme Being, which disposes all things; fate is the disposition inherent in all things which move, through which providence joins all things in their proper order. Providence embraces all things, however different, however infinite; fate sets in motion separately individual things, and assigns to them severally their position, form, and time.

'So the unfolding of this temporal order unified into the foreview of the Divine mind is providence, while the same unity broken up and unfolded in time is fate. And although these are different, yet is there a dependence between them; for the order of destiny issues from the essential simplicity of providence. For as the artificer, forming in his mind beforehand the idea of the thing to be made, carries out his design, and develops from moment to moment what he had before seen in a single instant as a whole, so God in His providence ordains all things as parts of a single unchanging whole, but carries out these very ordinances by fate in a time of manifold unity. So whether fate is accomplished by Divine spirits as the ministers of providence, or by a soul, or by the service of all nature—whether by the celestial motion of the stars, by the efficacy of angels, or by the many-sided cunning of demons—whether by all or by some of these the destined series is woven, this, at least, is manifest: that providence is the fixed and simple form of destined events, fate their shifting series in order of time, as by the disposal of the Divine simplicity they are to take place. Whereby it is that all things which are under fate are subjected also to providence, on which fate itself is dependent; whereas certain things which are set under providence are above the chain of fate—viz., those things which by their nearness to the primal Divinity are steadfastly fixed, and lie outside the order of fate's movements. For as the innermost of several circles revolving round the same centre approaches the simplicity of the midmost point, and is, as it were, a pivot round which the exterior circles turn, while the outermost, whirled in ampler orbit, takes in a wider and wider sweep of space in proportion to its departure from the indivisible unity of the centre—while, further, whatever joins and allies itself to the centre is narrowed to a like simplicity, and no longer expands vaguely into space—even so whatsoever departs widely from primal mind is involved more deeply in the meshes of fate, and things are free from fate in proportion as they seek to come nearer to that central pivot; while if aught cleaves close to supreme mind in its absolute fixity, this, too, being free from movement, rises above fate's necessity. Therefore, as is reasoning to pure intelligence, as that which is generated to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to its centre, so is the shifting series of fate to the steadfastness and simplicity of providence.

'It is this causal series which moves heaven and the stars, attempers the elements to mutual accord, and again in turn transforms them into new combinations; this which renews the series of all things that are born and die through like successions of germ and birth; it is its operation which binds the destinies of men by an indissoluble nexus of causality, and, since it issues in the beginning from unalterable providence, these destinies also must of necessity be immutable. Accordingly, the world is ruled for the best if this unity abiding in the Divine mind puts forth an inflexible order of causes. And this order, by its intrinsic immutability, restricts things mutable which otherwise would ebb and flow at random. And so it happens that, although to you, who are not altogether capable of understanding this order, all things seem confused and disordered, nevertheless there is everywhere an appointed limit which guides all things to good. Verily, nothing can be done for the sake of evil even by the wicked themselves; for, as we abundantly proved, they seek good, but are drawn out of the way by perverse error; far less can this order which sets out from the supreme centre of good turn aside anywhither from the way in which it began.

'"Yet what confusion," thou wilt say, "can be more unrighteous than that prosperity and adversity should indifferently befall the good, what they like and what they loathe come alternately to the bad!" Yes; but have men in real life such soundness of mind that their judgments of righteousness and wickedness must necessarily correspond with facts? Why, on this very point their verdicts conflict, and those whom some deem worthy of reward, others deem worthy of punishment. Yet granted there were one who could rightly distinguish the good and bad, yet would he be able to look into the soul's inmost constitution, as it were, if we may borrow an expression used of the body? The marvel here is not unlike that which astonishes one who does not know why in health sweet things suit some constitutions, and bitter others, or why some sick men are best alleviated by mild remedies, others by severe. But the physician who distinguishes the precise conditions and characteristics of health and sickness does not marvel. Now, the health of the soul is nothing but righteousness, and vice is its sickness. God, the guide and physician of the mind, it is who preserves the good and banishes the bad. And He looks forth from the lofty watch-tower of His providence, perceives what is suited to each, and assigns what He knows to be suitable.

'This, then, is what that extraordinary mystery of the order of destiny comes to—that something is done by one who knows, whereat the ignorant are astonished. But let us consider a few instances whereby appears what is the competency of human reason to fathom the Divine unsearchableness. Here is one whom thou deemest the perfection of justice and scrupulous integrity; to all-knowing Providence it seems far otherwise. We all know our Lucan's admonition that it was the winning cause that found favour with the gods, the beaten cause with Cato. So, shouldst thou see anything in this world happening differently from thy expectation, doubt not but events are rightly ordered; it is in thy judgment that there is perverse confusion.

'Grant, however, there be somewhere found one of so happy a character that God and man alike agree in their judgments about him; yet is he somewhat infirm in strength of mind. It may be, if he fall into adversity, he will cease to practise that innocency which has failed to secure his fortune. Therefore, God's wise dispensation spares him whom adversity might make worse, will not let him suffer who is ill fitted for endurance. Another there is perfect in all virtue, so holy and nigh to God that providence judges it unlawful that aught untoward should befall him; nay, doth not even permit him to be afflicted with bodily disease. As one more excellent than I^N hath said:

'"The very body of the holy saint
Is built of purest ether."

Often it happens that the governance is given to the good that a restraint may be put upon superfluity of wickedness. To others providence assigns some mixed lot suited to their spiritual nature; some it will plague lest they grow rank through long prosperity; others it will suffer to be vexed with sore afflictions to confirm their virtues by the exercise and practice of patience. Some fear overmuch what they have strength to bear; others despise overmuch that to which their strength is unequal. All these it brings to the test of their true self through misfortune. Some also have bought a name revered to future ages at the price of a glorious death; some by invincible constancy under their sufferings have afforded an example to others that virtue cannot be overcome by calamity—all which things, without doubt, come to pass rightly and in due order, and to the benefit of those to whom they are seen to happen.

'As to the other side of the marvel, that the bad now meet with affliction, now get their hearts' desire, this, too, springs from the same causes. As to the afflictions, of course no one marvels, because all hold the wicked to be ill deserving. The truth is, their punishments both frighten others from crime, and amend those on whom they are inflicted; while their prosperity is a powerful sermon to the good, what judgments they ought to pass on good fortune of this kind, which often attends the wicked so assiduously.

'There is another object which may, I believe, be attained in such cases: there is one, perhaps, whose nature is so reckless and violent that poverty would drive him more desperately into crime. His disorder providence relieves by allowing him to amass money. Such a one, in the uneasiness of a conscience stained with guilt, while he contrasts his character with his fortune, perchance grows alarmed lest he should come to mourn the loss of that whose possession is so pleasant to him. He will, then, reform his ways, and through the fear of losing his fortune he forsakes his iniquity. Some, through a prosperity unworthily borne, have been hurled headlong to ruin; to some the power of the sword has been committed, to the end that the good may be tried by discipline, and the bad punished. For while there can be no peace between the righteous and the wicked, neither can the wicked agree among themselves. How should they, when each is at variance with himself, because his vices rend his conscience, and ofttimes they do things which, when they are done, they judge ought not to have been done. Hence it is that this supreme providence brings to pass this notable marvel—that the bad make the bad good. For some, when they see the injustice which they themselves suffer at the hands of evil-doers, are inflamed with detestation of the offenders, and, in the endeavour to be unlike those whom they hate, return to the ways of virtue. It is the Divine power alone to which things evil are also good, in that, by putting them to suitable use, it bringeth them in the end to some good issue. For order in some way or other embraceth all things, so that even that which has departed from the appointed laws of the order, nevertheless falleth within an order, though another order, that nothing in the realm of providence may be left to haphazard. But

'"Hard were the task, as a god, to recount all, nothing omitting."

Nor, truly, is it lawful for man to compass in thought all the mechanism of the Divine work, or set it forth in speech. Let us be content to have apprehended this only—that God, the creator of universal nature, likewise disposeth all things, and guides them to good; and while He studies to preserve in likeness to Himself all that He has created, He banishes all evil from the borders of His commonweal through the links of fatal necessity. Whereby it comes to pass that, if thou look to disposing providence, thou wilt nowhere find the evils which are believed so to abound on earth.

'But I see thou hast long been burdened with the weight of the subject, and fatigued with the prolixity of the argument, and now lookest for some refreshment of sweet poesy. Listen, then, and may the draught so restore thee that thou wilt bend thy mind more resolutely to what remains.'