The Good Alone Have Power

Then I said: "Wonderful! How great things you promise! And I do not doubt that you can accomplish them; only do not delay now that you have roused me."

"First, then," she said, "you may recognize that power is always present to the good, and that the bad are deserted by all their strength; and one of these is proved from the other. For since good and evil are contraries, if it stands firm that the good is powerful, the weakness of evil is plain; and if the frailty of evil becomes clear, the firmness of good is known. But, so that confidence in our judgment may be more abundant, I will proceed by either path, confirming the propositions now from this side, now from that.

"There are two things on which the whole effect of human actions rests: will, namely, and power. If either of these is lacking, there is nothing that can be carried out. For when the will is missing, no one even attempts what he does not want; and if power is absent, the will is in vain. So it comes about that, if you see someone wishing to obtain what he by no means obtains, you cannot doubt that he lacked the strength to gain what he wanted."

"That is clear," I said, "and can in no way be denied."

"But the one whom you see has accomplished what he wished — do you doubt that he was also able?"

"Not at all."

"In what each person can do, in that he is to be judged strong; in what he cannot, in that, weak."

"I admit it," I said.

"Do you remember, then," she said, "that in our earlier reasonings it was gathered that the whole aim of the human will, though it is driven by various pursuits, hurries toward blessedness?"

"I remember," I said, "that this too was demonstrated."

"Do you recall that blessedness is the good itself, and that, in this way, when blessedness is sought, the good is desired by all?"

"I need not recall it," I said, "since I hold it fixed in my memory."

"All human beings, then, the good equally with the bad, strive by an undivided aim to reach the good?"

"That follows," I said.

"But it is certain that men become good by attaining the good?"

"Certain."

"The good, then, obtain what they seek?"

"So it seems."

"But the bad, if they obtained what they seek — the good — could not be bad."

"That is so."

"Since, then, both seek the good, but the one sort obtain it and the others by no means, can there be any doubt that the good are powerful, but those who are bad, weak?"

"Whoever doubts it," I said, "can consider neither the nature of things nor the logical sequence of arguments."

"Again," she said, "if there are two for whom the same goal is set according to nature, and one of them does and accomplishes that very thing by natural function, while the other cannot at all perform that natural function, but, in some other way than suits nature, does not indeed fulfill his purpose but imitates the one fulfilling it — which of these do you judge to be the stronger?"

"Even though I guess what you mean," I said, "I should like to hear it more plainly."

"You will not deny," she said, "that the motion of walking is natural to human beings?"

"Not at all," I said.

"And you do not doubt that the natural function for this is the function of the feet?"

"That neither," I said.

"If, then, one man who is able to step with his feet walks, and another, who lacks this natural function of the feet, tries to walk by leaning on his hands, which of these can rightly be judged the stronger?"

"Weave together the rest," I said; "for no one would doubt that the one who has the natural function is stronger than the one who cannot do the same."

"But the supreme good, which is equally set before bad and good, the good seek by the natural function of the virtues, while the bad strive to obtain that same thing through various forms of desire — which is not the natural function for obtaining the good. Or do you think otherwise?"

"Not at all," I said; "for what follows is also plain. From what I have granted, it is necessary that the good are powerful, but the bad weak."

"Rightly do you run ahead," she said; "and this, as physicians are wont to hope, is a sign of a nature now roused and resisting. But since I see you most ready to understand, I will heap up many arguments. For consider how great is the weakness of vicious men, who cannot even reach the goal toward which their natural aim leads and almost drives them. And what if they were deserted by this so great and almost unconquerable help of nature going before them? Consider, too, how great a powerlessness holds criminal men. For they do not seek trivial or playful prizes that they fail to attain and obtain; rather, they fall short at the very summit and peak of things, and the wretches gain no result in the one thing they labor at day and night — and in this the strength of the good stands out. For just as you would judge the man who, walking on his feet, could reach the point beyond which nothing lay open to his steps, to be the most powerful at walking, so you must judge the one who grasps the end of things to be sought, beyond which there is nothing, to be the most powerful. From which it follows — and this is the opposite of his case — that these same criminals appear to be deserted by all their strength.

"For why, abandoning virtue, do they pursue vices? Through ignorance of the good? But what is more enfeebled than the blindness of ignorance? Or do they know what is to be pursued, but lust drives them headlong off course? In this way too they are made frail by intemperance, since they cannot struggle against vice. Or do they knowingly and willingly forsake the good and turn aside to vices? In this way they cease not only to be powerful but to exist at all. For those who abandon the common end of all things that exist likewise cease to exist.

"This perhaps may seem strange to someone — that we should say the bad, who are the greater part of mankind, do not exist. But so the matter stands. For I do not deny that those who are bad are bad; but I deny that they exist purely and simply. For just as you would call a corpse a dead man, but could not simply call it a man, so I would grant that the vicious are bad, but I cannot confess that they exist absolutely. For that exists which keeps its order and preserves its nature; but what falls away from this also abandons existence, which lies in its own nature. 'But the bad have power,' you will say. Nor would I deny it; but this power of theirs descends not from strength but from weakness. For they have power to do evils, which they would by no means be able to do if they had been able to remain in the effectiveness of the good. And this possibility shows all the more clearly that they can do nothing; for if, as we gathered a little while ago, evil is nothing, then, since they can do only evils, it is plain that the wicked can do nothing."

"That is clear."

"And so that you may understand what the force of this power is: we defined a little while ago that nothing is more powerful than the supreme good."

"That is so," I said.

"But the same good cannot do evil."

"By no means."

"Is there anyone, then," she said, "who thinks that human beings can do all things?"

"No one, unless he is mad."

"And yet these same can do evils."

"Would that they could not!" I said.

"Since, then, the one who is powerful only for goods can do all things, while those who are also capable of evils cannot do all things, it is manifest that these same who can do evils have less power. To this is added that we have shown all power is to be counted among things to be sought, and that all things to be sought are referred to the good as to a kind of summit of their nature. But the possibility of committing crime cannot be referred to the good; therefore it is not to be sought. And yet all power is to be sought; it is plain, then, that the possibility of doing evil is not power.

"From all of which the power of the good, but the indubitable weakness of the bad, appears; and it is plain that the saying of Plato is true: that the wise alone are able to do what they desire, while the wicked may indeed practice what they please, but cannot fulfill what they desire. For they do whatever they like, supposing that through the things in which they take delight they will attain that good which they desire; but they by no means attain it, since base deeds do not arrive at blessedness."

Then said I: 'Verily, wondrous great are thy promises; yet I do not doubt but thou canst make them good: only keep me not in suspense after raising such hopes.'

'Learn, then, first,' said she, 'how that power ever waits upon the good, while the bad are left wholly destitute of strength.^K Of these truths the one proves the other; for since good and evil are contraries, if it is made plain that good is power, the feebleness of evil is clearly seen, and, conversely, if the frail nature of evil is made manifest, the strength of good is thereby known. However, to win ampler credence for my conclusion, I will pursue both paths, and draw confirmation for my statements first in one way and then in the other.

'The carrying out of any human action depends upon two things—to wit, will and power; if either be wanting, nothing can be accomplished. For if the will be lacking, no attempt at all is made to do what is not willed; whereas if there be no power, the will is all in vain. And so, if thou seest any man wishing to attain some end, yet utterly failing to attain it, thou canst not doubt that he lacked the power of getting what he wished for.'

'Why, certainly not; there is no denying it.'

'Canst thou, then, doubt that he whom thou seest to have accomplished what he willed had also the power to accomplish it?'

'Of course not.'

'Then, in respect of what he can accomplish a man is to be reckoned strong, in respect of what he cannot accomplish weak?'

'Granted,' said I.

'Then, dost thou remember that, by our former reasonings, it was concluded that the whole aim of man's will, though the means of pursuit vary, is set intently upon happiness?'

'I do remember that this, too, was proved.'

'Dost thou also call to mind how happiness is absolute good, and therefore that, when happiness is sought, it is good which is in all cases the object of desire?'

'Nay, I do not so much call to mind as keep it fixed in my memory.'

'Then, all men, good and bad alike, with one indistinguishable purpose strive to reach good?'

'Yes, that follows.'

'But it is certain that by the attainment of good men become good?'

'It is.'

'Then, do the good attain their object?'

'It seems so.'

'But if the bad were to attain the good which is their object, they could not be bad?'

'No.'

'Then, since both seek good, but while the one sort attain it, the other attain it not, is there any doubt that the good are endued with power, while they who are bad are weak?'

'If any doubt it, he is incapable of reflecting on the nature of things, or the consequences involved in reasoning.'

'Again, supposing there are two things to which the same function is prescribed in the course of nature, and one of these successfully accomplishes the function by natural action, the other is altogether incapable of that natural action, instead of which, in a way other than is agreeable to its nature, it—I will not say fulfils its function, but feigns to fulfil it: which of these two would in thy view be the stronger?'

'I guess thy meaning, but I pray thee let me hear thee more at large.'

'Walking is man's natural motion, is it not?'

'Certainly.'

'Thou dost not doubt, I suppose, that it is natural for the feet to discharge this function?'

'No; surely I do not.'

'Now, if one man who is able to use his feet walks, and another to whom the natural use of his feet is wanting tries to walk on his hands, which of the two wouldst thou rightly esteem the stronger?'

'Go on,' said I; 'no one can question but that he who has the natural capacity has more strength than he who has it not.'

'Now, the supreme good is set up as the end alike for the bad and for the good; but the good seek it through the natural action of the virtues, whereas the bad try to attain this same good through all manner of concupiscence, which is not the natural way of attaining good. Or dost thou think otherwise?'

'Nay; rather, one further consequence is clear to me: for from my admissions it must needs follow that the good have power, and the bad are impotent.'

'Thou anticipatest rightly, and that as physicians reckon is a sign that nature is set working, and is throwing off the disease. But, since I see thee so ready at understanding, I will heap proof on proof. Look how manifest is the extremity of vicious men's weakness; they cannot even reach that goal to which the aim of nature leads and almost constrains them. What if they were left without this mighty, this well-nigh irresistible help of nature's guidance! Consider also how momentous is the powerlessness which incapacitates the wicked. Not light or trivial^L are the prizes which they contend for, but which they cannot win or hold; nay, their failure concerns the very sum and crown of things. Poor wretches! they fail to compass even that for which they toil day and night. Herein also the strength of the good conspicuously appears. For just as thou wouldst judge him to be the strongest walker whose legs could carry him to a point beyond which no further advance was possible, so must thou needs account him strong in power who so attains the end of his desires that nothing further to be desired lies beyond. Whence follows the obvious conclusion that they who are wicked are seen likewise to be wholly destitute of strength. For why do they forsake virtue and follow vice? Is it from ignorance of what is good? Well, what is more weak and feeble than the blindness of ignorance? Do they know what they ought to follow, but lust drives them aside out of the way? If it be so, they are still frail by reason of their incontinence, for they cannot fight against vice. Or do they knowingly and wilfully forsake the good and turn aside to vice? Why, at this rate, they not only cease to have power, but cease to be at all. For they who forsake the common end of all things that are, they likewise also cease to be at all. Now, to some it may seem strange that we should assert that the bad, who form the greater part of mankind, do not exist. But the fact is so. I do not, indeed, deny that they who are bad are bad, but that they are in an unqualified and absolute sense I deny. Just as we call a corpse a dead man, but cannot call it simply "man," so I would allow the vicious to be bad, but that they are in an absolute sense I cannot allow. That only is which maintains its place and keeps its nature; whatever falls away from this forsakes the existence which is essential to its nature. "But," thou wilt say, "the bad have an ability." Nor do I wish to deny it; only this ability of theirs comes not from strength, but from impotence. For their ability is to do evil, which would have had no efficacy at all if they could have continued in the performance of good. So this ability of theirs proves them still more plainly to have no power. For if, as we concluded just now, evil is nothing, 'tis clear that the wicked can effect nothing, since they are only able to do evil.'

''Tis evident.'

'And that thou mayst understand what is the precise force of this power, we determined, did we not, awhile back, that nothing has more power than supreme good?'

'We did,' said I.

'But that same highest good cannot do evil?'

'Certainly not.'

'Is there anyone, then, who thinks that men are able to do all things?'

'None but a madman.'

'Yet they are able to do evil?'

'Ay; would they could not!'

'Since, then, he who can do only good is omnipotent, while they who can do evil also are not omnipotent, it is manifest that they who can do evil have less power. There is this also: we have shown that all power is to be reckoned among things desirable, and that all desirable things are referred to good as to a kind of consummation of their nature. But the ability to commit crime cannot be referred to the good; therefore it is not a thing to be desired. And yet all power is desirable; it is clear, then, that ability to do evil is not power. From all which considerations appeareth the power of the good, and the indubitable weakness of the bad, and it is clear that Plato's judgment was true; the wise alone are able to do what they would, while the wicked follow their own hearts' lust, but can not accomplish what they would. For they go on in their wilfulness fancying they will attain what they wish for in the paths of delight; but they are very far from its attainment, since shameful deeds lead not to happiness.'