God Is Happiness Itself

"Since, then, you have seen what is the form of the imperfect good, and also of the perfect good, I think I must now show where this perfection of happiness is set.

"And in this I think the first thing to be inquired is whether any good of this kind, such as you defined a little while ago, can exist in the nature of things, so that an empty image of thought may not deceive us, beyond the truth of the matter in question. But that it exists, and is, as it were, a certain fountain of all goods, cannot be denied. For everything that is said to be imperfect is said to be imperfect through a diminution of the perfect. So it comes about that if anything imperfect seems to exist in any kind, there must also be something perfect in that kind. For if perfection is taken away, it cannot even be imagined how the thing that is called imperfect should have come to exist. For the nature of things did not take its beginning from things diminished and unfinished, but, proceeding from things whole and complete, it falls away into these last and exhausted things. But if, as we showed a little while ago, there is a certain fragile, imperfect happiness of the good, it cannot be doubted that there is some solid and perfect happiness."

"Most firmly and most truly concluded," I said.

"But where it dwells, consider thus. The common conception of human minds proves that God, the prince of all things, is good. For since nothing better than God can be conceived, who would doubt that what nothing is better than is good? And reason demonstrates that God is good in such a way that it proves the perfect good to be in him as well. For if it were not so, he could not be the prince of all things; for there would be something more excellent than he, possessing the perfect good, which would seem to be prior and older than he; for all perfect things have been shown to be prior to those less whole. So, lest reasoning go on to infinity, we must confess that the highest God is most full of the highest and perfect good. But we have established that the perfect good is true happiness: so true happiness must necessarily be set in the highest God."

"I accept it," I said, "and there is nothing that could in any way be said against it."

"But I ask you," she said, "see how reverently and inviolably you prove this—that we have said the highest God is most full of the highest good."

"In what way?" I said.

"Do not presume that this Father of all things has either received from outside that highest good with which he is said to be full, or possesses it so naturally that you would think the substance of God who possesses, and of the happiness possessed, to be different. For if you think it received from outside, you could reckon what gave it more excellent than what received it. But we most worthily confess this God to be the most preeminent of all things. And if it is in him by nature, yet is different in reason—since we are speaking of God, the prince of things—let whoever can imagine who joined these different things together. Finally, what is different from any thing is not that from which it is understood to be different. So what is by its own nature different from the highest good is not the highest good—which it is wicked to think about him than whom nothing is agreed to be more excellent. For in no way could the nature of anything be better than its own origin; so I would conclude, by truest reasoning, that what is the origin of all things is also in its own substance the highest good."

"Most rightly," I said.

"But it has been granted that the highest good is happiness."

"It is so," I said.

"So," she said, "we must necessarily confess that God is happiness itself."

"I cannot contradict the premises set down before," I said, "and I see that this follows as a consequence drawn from them."

"Look," she said, "whether the same is more firmly proved from this too: that there cannot be two highest goods which differ from each other. For it is clear that goods which differ are not the one what the other is; so neither could be perfect, since each lacks the other. But what is not perfect manifestly is not the highest; so in no way can goods that are highest be different. But we have gathered that both happiness and God are the highest good; so it must necessarily be that the highest happiness is the same as the highest divinity."

"Nothing," I said, "could be concluded truer in fact, or firmer in reasoning, or worthier of God."

"On top of these things, then," she said, "as geometers are wont, from their demonstrated propositions, to infer something which they call a corollary, so I too will give you, as it were, a corollary. For since human beings become blessed by obtaining happiness, and happiness is divinity itself, it is plain that they become blessed by obtaining divinity. But just as people become just by obtaining justice, wise by obtaining wisdom, so by like reasoning those who have obtained divinity must necessarily become gods. So every blessed person is a god. By nature, indeed, there is one God; but by participation nothing prevents there being very many."

"This is beautiful," I said, "and precious, whether you prefer to call it a corollary or a porism."

"And yet nothing is more beautiful than this, which reason persuades us must be added to these things."

"What?" I said.

"Since happiness seems to contain many things," she said, "do all these join together, like one body of happiness, by a certain variety of parts, or is there some one of them that completes the substance of happiness, to which the rest are referred?"

"I would like you to make this clear," I said, "by mentioning the things themselves."

"Do we not judge happiness to be a good?"

"Indeed the highest," I said.

"You may add this of all of them. For the same self-sufficiency is the highest, the same the highest power; reverence too, and renown and pleasure are judged to be happiness. What then—are all these, self-sufficiency, power, and the rest, as it were certain members of happiness, or are they all referred to the good as to a summit?"

"I understand what you propose to investigate," I said, "but I long to hear what you decide."

"Receive the distinction of the matter thus: if all these were members of happiness, they would also differ from one another. For this is the nature of parts, that different things compose one body. But all these have been shown to be the same; so they are by no means members. Otherwise happiness will seem to be joined together from one member, which cannot happen."

"That indeed is not in doubt," I said, "but I await what remains."

"It is plain that the rest are referred to the good. For self-sufficiency is sought for this reason, because it is judged to be good; power likewise, because it too is believed to be good; the same may be conjectured about reverence, renown, and pleasantness. So the good is the sum and cause of all things to be sought. For what holds in itself no good, neither in reality nor in semblance, can in no way be sought. And, on the contrary, things that are not good by nature are nevertheless sought, if they seem to be, as if they were truly good. So it comes about that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum, the hinge, and the cause of all things to be sought. And that for the sake of which something is sought seems to be most of all what is wished for. For instance, if someone wishes to ride for the sake of health, he does not so much desire the motion of riding as the effect of health. Since, then, all things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not those things but the good itself that is desired by all. But we granted that happiness is that for the sake of which the rest are wished for; so in this way too happiness alone is sought. From which it clearly appears that the substance of the good itself and of happiness is one and the same."

"I see no reason why anyone could disagree."

"But we have shown that God and true happiness are one and the same."

"Yes," I said.

"So we may safely conclude that the substance of God too is set in the good itself, and nowhere else."

'Since now thou hast seen what is the form of the imperfect good, and what the form of the perfect also, methinks I should next show in what manner this perfection of felicity is built up. And here I conceive it proper to inquire, first, whether any excellence, such as thou hast lately defined, can exist in the nature of things, lest we be deceived by an empty fiction of thought to which no true reality answers. But it cannot be denied that such does exist, and is, as it were, the source of all things good. For everything which is called imperfect is spoken of as imperfect by reason of the privation of some perfection; so it comes to pass that, whenever imperfection is found in any particular, there must necessarily be a perfection in respect of that particular also. For were there no such perfection, it is utterly inconceivable how that so-called imperfection should come into existence. Nature does not make a beginning with things mutilated and imperfect; she starts with what is whole and perfect, and falls away later to these feeble and inferior productions. So if there is, as we showed before, a happiness of a frail and imperfect kind, it cannot be doubted but there is also a happiness substantial and perfect.'

'Most true is thy conclusion, and most sure,' said I.

'Next to consider where the dwelling-place of this happiness may be. The common belief of all mankind agrees that God, the supreme of all things, is good. For since nothing can be imagined better than God, how can we doubt Him to be good than whom there is nothing better? Now, reason shows God to be good in such wise as to prove that in Him is perfect good. For were it not so, He would not be supreme of all things; for there would be something else more excellent, possessed of perfect good, which would seem to have the advantage in priority and dignity, since it has clearly appeared that all perfect things are prior to those less complete. Wherefore, lest we fall into an infinite regression, we must acknowledge the supreme God to be full of supreme and perfect good. But we have determined that true happiness is the perfect good; therefore true happiness must dwell in the supreme Deity.'

'I accept thy reasonings,' said I; 'they cannot in any wise be disputed.'

'But, come, see how strictly and incontrovertibly thou mayst prove this our assertion that the supreme Godhead hath fullest possession of the highest good.'

'In what way, pray?' said I.

'Do not rashly suppose that He who is the Father of all things hath received that highest good of which He is said to be possessed either from some external source, or hath it as a natural endowment in such sort that thou mightest consider the essence of the happiness possessed, and of the God who possesses it, distinct and different. For if thou deemest it received from without, thou mayst esteem that which gives more excellent than that which has received. But Him we most worthily acknowledge to be the most supremely excellent of all things. If, however, it is in Him by nature, yet is logically distinct, the thought is inconceivable, since we are speaking of God, who is supreme of all things. Who was there to join these distinct essences? Finally, when one thing is different from another, the things so conceived as distinct cannot be identical. Therefore that which of its own nature is distinct from the highest good is not itself the highest good—an impious thought of Him than whom, 'tis plain, nothing can be more excellent. For universally nothing can be better in nature than the source from which it has come; therefore on most true grounds of reason would I conclude that which is the source of all things to be in its own essence the highest good.'

'And most justly,' said I.

'But the highest good has been admitted to be happiness.'

'Yes.'

'Then,' said she, 'it is necessary to acknowledge that God is very happiness.'

'Yes,' said I; 'I cannot gainsay my former admissions, and I see clearly that this is a necessary inference therefrom.'

'Reflect, also,' said she, 'whether the same conclusion is not further confirmed by considering that there cannot be two supreme goods distinct one from the other. For the goods which are different clearly cannot be severally each what the other is: wherefore neither of the two can be perfect, since to either the other is wanting; but since it is not perfect, it cannot manifestly be the supreme good. By no means, then, can goods which are supreme be different one from the other. But we have concluded that both happiness and God are the supreme good; wherefore that which is highest Divinity must also itself necessarily be supreme happiness.'

'No conclusion,' said I, 'could be truer to fact, nor more soundly reasoned out, nor more worthy of God.'

'Then, further,' said she, 'just as geometricians are wont to draw inferences from their demonstrations to which they give the name "deductions," so will I add here a sort of corollary. For since men become happy by the acquisition of happiness, while happiness is very Godship, it is manifest that they become happy by the acquisition of Godship. But as by the acquisition of justice men become just, and wise by the acquisition of wisdom, so by parity of reasoning by acquiring Godship they must of necessity become gods. So every man who is happy is a god; and though in nature God is One only, yet there is nothing to hinder that very many should be gods by participation in that nature.'

'A fair conclusion, and a precious,' said I, 'deduction or corollary, by whichever name thou wilt call it.'

'And yet,' said she, 'not one whit fairer than this which reason persuades us to add.'

'Why, what?' said I.

'Why, seeing happiness has many particulars included under it, should all these be regarded as forming one body of happiness, as it were, made up of various parts, or is there some one of them which forms the full essence of happiness, while all the rest are relative to this?'

'I would thou wouldst unfold the whole matter to me at large.'

'We judge happiness to be good, do we not?'

'Yea, the supreme good.'

'And this superlative applies to all; for this same happiness is adjudged to be the completest independence, the highest power, reverence, renown, and pleasure.'

'What then?'

'Are all these goods—independence, power, and the rest—to be deemed members of happiness, as it were, or are they all relative to good as to their summit and crown?'

'I understand the problem, but I desire to hear how thou wouldst solve it.'

'Well, then, listen to the determination of the matter. Were all these members composing happiness, they would differ severally one from the other. For this is the nature of parts—that by their difference they compose one body. All these, however, have been proved to be the same; therefore they cannot possibly be members, otherwise happiness will seem to be built up out of one member, which cannot be.'

'There can be no doubt as to that,' said I; 'but I am impatient to hear what remains.'

'Why, it is manifest that all the others are relative to the good. For the very reason why independence is sought is that it is judged good, and so power also, because it is believed to be good. The same, too, may be supposed of reverence, of renown, and of pleasant delight. Good, then, is the sum and source of all desirable things. That which has not in itself any good, either in reality or in semblance, can in no wise be desired. Contrariwise, even things which by nature are not good are desired as if they were truly good, if they seem to be so. Whereby it comes to pass that goodness is rightly believed to be the sum and hinge and cause of all things desirable. Now, that for the sake of which anything is desired itself seems to be most wished for. For instance, if anyone wishes to ride for the sake of health, he does not so much wish for the exercise of riding as the benefit of his health. Since, then, all things are sought for the sake of the good, it is not these so much as good itself that is sought by all. But that on account of which all other things are wished for was, we agreed, happiness; wherefore thus also it appears that it is happiness alone which is sought. From all which it is transparently clear that the essence of absolute good and of happiness is one and the same.'

'I cannot see how anyone can dissent from these conclusions.'

'But we have also proved that God and true happiness are one and the same.'

'Yes,' said I.

'Then we can safely conclude, also, that God's essence is seated in absolute good, and nowhere else.'